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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JLLlAM

CHESS,
Petitioner-Appellant,

-v·

l)\.JRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
~·tah State Prison,

Case No. 16085

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of an action filed in the Third Judicial
District Court in a habeas corpus petition in which the appellant
sought release from custody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison
'

bv

reason of the commitment issued by the Second Judicial District

Court in and for Weber County in Criminal No. 12095-A.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant's petition came on for hearing on Thursday,
August 17, 1978, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya who heard
testimony and reviewed the trial transcript and ordered that the
relief sought in the complaint for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the order of the Third
District Court and an order of this Court granting him release from
the commitment
orQuinney
a new
trial.
Sponsored by the S.J.
Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant was tried on December 16 and 17, 1976,
before the Second Judicial District Court on a charge of
Robbery, a First Degree Felony.

Aggravated
The appellant was one of two co-

defendants in the case, each charged with being an accomplice.

The

person who admitted to robbing the gas station, Ray Shearer, was
not on trial because of a previous plea of guilty to a reduced
offense (T. 55).

He was called at the trial, but did not implicate

the appellant or the co-defendant.
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the
State, included the fact that the appellant and the co-defendant
merely pulled into a gas station in a vehicle (T. 43).

The two

persons in the car that pulled into the gas station did not get
out of the car and left after a purchase of gasoline.

The State's

theory at trial rested upon the fact that the appellant was identi·
fied at or near the time Raymond Shearer entered the situation,
The appellant was found guilty and later sentenced to
the Utah State Prison.
At the hearing held before the Court in the habeas corpus
proceeding the appellant testified that he appeared in jail clothes
at the trial held on December 16 and 17, 1976, in the Second Judicia:
District Court.

He stated that he requested to appear otherwise,

but was told by his counsel that it was tood late to make any
arrangements for other clothes.
He also stated that he did not appeal his conviction
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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:r

: 3 sed

upon the fact that he received a letter which represented

:'.at if he was awarded

a new trial, he may be found guilty and

J~ished for a greater offense than the prison sentence he is
~esently serving for the conviction.
~traduced

A copy of that letter was

in evidence.

1e

ia:

POINT I
THE APPELLANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS THE RESULT OF THE REPRESENTATION CONTAINED
IN THE LETTER OF HIS APPOINTED COUNSEL.
An abridgment of the appellant's right to appeal his
conviction is incompatible with his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
v. United States, 469 F. 2d 634 (C .A. Ga. 1972).

Chapman

When the state

procedure provides for an appellate review, the appeal afforded to
a defendant must comport with due process of the law.
~·

Borrough v.

497 F.2d 1007 (CA. Tex. 1974).
In Levine v. Peyton, 444 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1971), the

Federal Court of Appeals held that due process requires that the
defendant be freed

of the apprehension of receiving a harsher

sentence after the re-trial of his case and that the Due Process
Clause forbids harsher sentences after re-trial.

This rule has

also been applied continually by the state courts which also prohibit
the courts from giving greater sentences upon re-trial than were
originally meted out by the trial court.

State v. Castro, 554 P.2d

914 (Ariz. App. 1976) and State v. Gantt, 492 P.2d 1199 (Ariz. 1972).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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In the present case, but for the improper represent t·
a lons
of appointed counsel set forth in the correspondence introduced .
1n

evidence, the appellant would have pursued his statutory right to
appeal.

At the hearing, the appellant testified that b t f

representations he would have pursued his appeal.

or these
u
If awarded a new

trial, the Fourteenth Amendment would have prevented the trial cour:
from imposing upon the appellant a greater punishment than he is
presently receiving and he would have been entitled to credit f~
time served.

Because of the representations of his appointed

counsel, the appellant was therefore denied his right to appeal
and therefore he is being unjustly and unlawfully restrained of
his liberty.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW BECAUSE HE APPEARED BEFORE THE JURY DRESSED
IN IDENTIFIABLE PRISON CLOTHES.
In the case of Estelle v. Williams, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976),
the United States Supreme Court held that a state cannot, consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial be·
fore a jury

dressed in prison clothes.

The Court also found that

the trial judge had no duty to inquire of the defendant as to whether
he was going intentionally to trial in prison clothes.
However, in this case, the appellant actually made a
request to his appointed counsel and therefore the case of Estelle
· h a bl e.
v. Williams is distingu1.s

The wa1."ver of the appellant's con·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lt

1er

,:i~utional right was not the type of personal, knowing waiver

;s '..las contemplated by the Estelle decision,
POINT III
BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHICH EXISTED
BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATION OF THE APPELLANT BY
HIS COUNSEL AND THE KEY WITNESS FOR THE STATE AND
THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY OBJECT DURING THE TRIAL
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
At the appellant's trial, the State called Raymond Shearer,
the self-confessed perpetrator of the robbery of the gas station
,,hich the appellant was also charged as an accomplice (T. 55).
The record reveals that the witness called by the State was repre-

•

sented by the attorney who was defending the appellant in the case
before the Court (T. 57).
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee an
accused the right to counsel at trial.
U,S. 335 (1963).

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

It is well settled that one lawyer may represent

more than one defendant so long as his representation is effective.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

However, effective assistance

of counsel contemplates that such assistance be "untrammeled and
unimpaired by . . . requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously
represent conflicting interests."
U.S. 60,

70

Glasser v. United States, 315

(1942).

The danger implicit in dual representation is that an
attorney who undertakes such a task finds himself simultaneously
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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balancing the interests of each defendant against the other.

The

problem is aggravated by the fact that an attorney can rarely
predict when a conflict of interest will or will not arise.
There are too many unknown variables in a criminal trial for an
attorney to presume to know whether the int~rests of one client
will conflict with another.
Since Glasser v. United States, supra, the Supreme Coun
has only recently re-examined the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel due to conflicts of interest.
U.S.

In Holloway v. Arkansas
_,

(1978), 23 Cr. L. 3001, three co-defendants were

jointly represented by a court appointed lawyer.
The Supreme Court held that ~e failure to either appoint
separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether
the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel, in the face
of the representations made by counsel weeks before trial and again
before the jury was empane lled, deprived petitioners of the guaranti,
of assistance of counsel.

In reaching this result, the Court statec

that:
In the normal case where a harmless error rule
is applied, the error occurs at trial and its
scope is readily identifiable . . . Bit in a
case of joint representation of conflicting
interests the evil - it bears repeating - is
in what the advocate finds himself compelled
to refrain from doing . . . Thus, an inquiry,
into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.
23 Cr. L. at 3005.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~us. the Hollowav court concluded that because of the masked

:.acure of such an error, requiring a defendant to show any amount
!i prejudice would be too much.

The plaintiff submits that where no on-the-record waiver
of his right to conflict-free counsel appears (R. l-4), the burden
shifts to the State to prove either that no conflict existed, or
rt

to prove that the conflict did not impair his representation at
trial.

~I

int

The importance of the right to counsel has sparked courts

to formulate a prophylactic rule to insure his protection of the
important right to counsel.
In United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d l (lst Cir., 1974),
a drug defendant challenged his conviction where his attorney had
also represented his co-defendant.

In rejecting this claim, the

Court found that there was no divergence in the interests of the co-

ain

defendants.

anti,

tion had not adversely affected the defendant in that case, the

atee

Court went on to announce a rule that the lack of a satisfactory

Although the First Circuit held that dual representa-

judicial inquiry into dual representation shifts the burden of
proof on the question of prejudice to the government.

In such a

situation, the government is required to demonstrate from the record
the unlikelihood of prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence.

In stating this rule, the Court specifically recognized the
difficulties associated with an after-the-fact reconstruction of
prejudice.

See also, State v. Olsen, 258 tLW. 2d 898. (Minn., 1977).
In the present case, the trial court made no inquiry as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 7 -

to problems raised by the dual representation by appellant's
counsel.

Furthermore, the appellant was prejudiced when this

entire matter was brought to the jury's attention during the tri~
(R. 58).

Therefore, the appellant submits that he is entitled to

either a new trial or release from custody because of the dual

n~

resentation and conflict of interest and the denial of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
In addition, the appellant asserts that he was also
denied effective assistance of counsel because of his attorney's
failure to properly object to the testimony introduced at trial
or to raise this matter prior to trail.

The confict should have

been resolved prior to trial to avoid the prejudice that resulted
to the appellant.
POINT IV
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS A RESULT
OF THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS THAT OCCURRED AT THE
TRIAL AND HE SHOULD THEREFORE BE AWARDED A NEW
TRIAL A!ID THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE VERDICT.
In State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323 (Utah, 1955), the
Supreme Court held that a combination of errors which when singu·
larly considered might be thought insufficient to warrant a reversal, may when considered as to the cumulative effect call for
reversal.
In the appellant's case, the circumstantial evidence at
best would indicate that the appellant merely pulled into a gas
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

;:J::ion in a car and then left the station.

The State alleged

0 ac this was part of a plan to rob the gas station by distracting
:'le attention of the attendant. However, the principal to the

il

Jffense denied that the appellant was involved and the evidence
introduced does not support the State's contention.

:p.

.t

The appellant submits the trial court erred in allowing
:he statements made by the palintiff after the robbery into evidence
·;ithout any showing of the Miranda Warning (T. 35) .
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965).

:::---

Miranda v.

The officer taking the statements

stated that he considered Mr. Chess a suspect when he was taken
do~

to the police headquarters for interrogation (T. 46).

"request" to go down to the station

The

occurred right after the

officers had conducted a search of both the premises and the
vehicle parked in front of the premises at which the appellant was
staying (T. 44) .
During the examination of the owner of the gas station,
the prosecutor asked a series of leading questions designed to
elicit conclusions which the witness did not have the ability to
draw from his personal observations (Line 12 to line 22, T. 33).
This testimony was extremely prejudiced because the State had
to rely upon circumstantial evidence to elicit certain assumptions
about the state of mind of the appellant whose actions standing
alone were entirely innocent.

This line of questioning violated

Rules 19 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence .
There also exists a substantial question as to whether
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the search of the appellant's premises was constltUtlonal
·
·
under
the parameters of the Fourth Amendment to t h e unlte
· d States Con .
s tt.
tution. At page 44 of the transcript one of the officers sear~·

tn 1

the premises stated:
I asked the young man--both of them were very
nervous--at this time if I may search their
premises for a white male involved. They told
me they didn't know of a white male; they didn't
have a friend, and hadn't seen one.
I looked through their apartment anyway. Going
through their apartment I found another holster
for a long barreled revolver or pistol. I asked
them about this, and they didn't know anything
about it.
(T. 44).
This testimony is in contradiction to the earlier testimony
that
the search was based upon the consent of the appellant.
Finally, the State called the head jailer of the Weber
County Jail (T. 103).

He testified that the appellant and the

co-defendant, Herbert White, were inmates at the jail and were
housed in the same area as the witness, Steve Shearer (T. lOS).
This evidence was extremely unduly prejudicial and was not relevant
to any issue in the trial.

Utah Rules of Evidence 45.

As pointed

out in Point I of this brief, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevents the unnecessary interjection of the
fact of the appellant's incarceration.

The error of introducing

this testimony magnified by the fact that the testimony was not
relevant to prove any material issue in the case.

The error was

further compounded by the improper comment of the prosecution con·
cerning this evidence (T. 228).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It

In light of the circumstantial and in-direct evidence
,,: the guilt of the appellant at trial, the cumulative effect of

:r.e evidentiary errors is magnified.

The theory of accomplice

:orallY is stretched past the limit in the present case.

The

evidence introduced concerning the actual events surrounding the
robbery show no overt act or indication that the two persons in
the car at the gas station were knowingly participating in the
robbery committed in fact by Raymond Shearer.
The appellant respectfully submits that a review by
the Court of the evidence introduced, the trial court should not
have permitted this matter to hav~ been submitted to the jury.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the appellant submits that in light of the
improper evidence introduced at trial coupled with the errors set
forth in Points I, II, and III of this brief, the appellant was
denied a fair trial and this Court should award the appellant a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM CHESS
Pro Se

RANDALL GAITHER
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